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experimental multiple-dealer market in which seven professional market makers
trade a single security. The dealers trade with one another and with computerized
informed and liquidity traders. Our key comparison is between fully public price
queues (pretrade transparent market) and bilateral quoting (pretrade opaque). We
ﬁnd that opening spreads are wider and trading volume is lower in the opaque
marketsduetohighersearchcoststhere.Moreimportantly,however,highersearch
costs also induce more aggressive pricing strategies, so that price discovery is
much faster in the opaque markets.
This article addresses the institutional design of ﬁnancial markets. It con-
centrates on the degree of public quote disclosure in the market and its
effect on the price discovery process. We are most interested in transactable
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prices (i.e., live quotes) rather than indicative prices or posttrade transac-
tionprices.Speciﬁcallyweaskhowthedegreeofpublicquotedisclosureof
transactablepricesaffectsimportantmarketcharacteristics,suchastransac-
tion costs and the dynamic adjustment to strong-form efﬁcient prices (price
discovery).
Worldwide, many ﬁnancial markets coexist while differing crucially in
the way market participants receive price information. For example, elec-
tronic limit order books, such as those on the Paris Bourse, are very price
transparent, since brokers can obtain information on quotes and order sizes
from all limit orders on the book. On the other hand, the London SEAQ
display (and, to a lesser extent, the NASDAQ) provide participants with
quotes, but these are largely indicative, since most market makers will im-
prove upon their quoted bids and asks in telephone negotiations, offering
within-the-quotes prices for most transactions. Even close substitutes, such
as foreign currency futures and forward contracts, trade in markets with
very different degrees of quote disclosure. One explanation for these co-
existing quote disclosure regimes in ﬁnancial markets is clearly found in
the type of securities being traded. For example, futures trading is typically
centralized (while forward trading usually is not), at least in part because
futurescontractsarestandardized.However,itisfrequentlythecasethatthe
same security trades in different microstructures, often simultaneously, and
sometimes even in the same room. For example, the NYSE runs a call mar-
ketatthemorningopeningandcontinuousspecialisttradingthroughoutthe
day, along with a separate upstairs market for block trades. The foreign ex-
change market operates simultaneously as a decentralized interbank direct
market and a more centralized brokered market.
It is generally assumed that price-transparent microstructures better al-
low traders to extract information from outstanding quotes, leading (rather
intuitively) to prices impounding a maximum of available information. For
example, O’Hara (1995, p. 270) notes that, “the transparency of prices al-
lowstradersbetterabilitytoextractpriceinformationfromthemarketprice,
a process that surely abets the goal of equilibrium price discovery.”1 From
this point of view, it is not obvious why markets with different levels of
pretrade transparency coexist (following Pagano and R¨ oell (1996), we say
a market is fully pretrade transparent if at all times participants can clearly
seealloutstandingquotes).Inthisarticlewemeasuretheeffectsofpretrade
transparency on the pricing and inventory strategies of market makers, in
terms of liquidity (spreads and volume) and the price discovery process.
1 There is a vast literature on market transparency, including empirical and experimental studies of price
discovery. Surveys of the relevant microstructure literature are available in Admati (1991), Yu (1993),
and O’Hara (1995, especially ch. 9). Stoll (1992) and Harris (1993) survey issues related to institutional
design. Goodhart and O’Hara (1994) and Guillaume et al. (1994) cover recent empirical results. Davis
and Holt (1993, especially chs. 3 and 5) and Duxbury (1995) survey the experimental literature.
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We ﬁnd a trade-off between liquidity and price efﬁciency that may partly
explain the coexistence of microstructures with different levels of pretrade
transparency.
Our study attempts to advance the literature in several dimensions. First,
weprovideadirectcomparisonofalternativemicrostructuralarrangements.
Such direct comparisons are relatively rare, as theoretical studies require
restrictive assumptions about dealer behavior and information processing,
while traditional empirical studies are subject to strong ceteris paribus
caveats in such a comparison across regimes. The experimental method-
ology directly addresses both of these limitations: by using human subjects
inacontrolledenvironment,theneedforbothbehavioralandceterisparibus
assumptions is sharply reduced. Second, we focus exclusively on multiple-
dealer markets. Most microstructural analyses concentrate on lone dealers,
in spite of the importance of multiple-dealer markets, such as the interbank
foreign exchange and money markets or the over-the-counter stock, bond,
and derivatives markets. We argue that interactions among multiple deal-
ers can produce interesting phenomena that do not arise in single-dealer
environments. Lastly, we focus on the interaction between inventory man-
agementandpricinginadealer’sstrategy.Suchafocusisgreatlyfacilitated
by the methodology, which produces a large amount of simultaneous data
on prices, inventories, and dealer information sets.
Despite the numerous studies of posttrade transparency [deﬁned as the
amountoftransactioninformationavailabletomarketmakers,asperPagano
and R¨ oell (1996)], the effects of (pretrade) quote disclosure on market
performance have received much less attention.2 Madhavan (1992) dis-
tinguishes between “order-driven” and “quote-driven” markets, compar-
ing their relative price efﬁciency. In quote-driven markets, investors trade
against outstanding prices, while in order-driven markets, participants must
submit orders ﬁrst, after which prices are determined. The quote-driven
markets are necessarily more pretrade transparent than order-driven mar-
kets. Madhavan ﬁnds that a quote-driven market is more price efﬁcient
than an order-driven market. Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) compare dif-
ferent “book lengths” for an electronic limit order book (patterned on the
CME=ReutersGlobextradingsystem)inacomputersimulation.Theirgen-
eral conclusion is that increasing book length—the number of limit orders
held on the book and broadcast to participants—improves price discovery
(with the exception of trading in unit lots, for which a technical artifact of
the order-posting algorithm slows price discovery).
The experimental approach to ﬁnancial markets is a growing ﬁeld. Ex-
amplesarethestudiesofSchnitzlein(1996)andLamoureuxandSchnitzlein
2 Recent examples of the former include Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1999), Gemmill (1996), Pagano and
R¨ oell (1996) , R¨ oell (1996) and Flood et al. (1997).
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(1997),whodesignedanauctionmarketbasedonthetheoreticalframework
of the Kyle (1985) model. In this article, on the other hand, the experimen-
tal environment can be seen as the continuous, multiple-dealer version of
the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, which is a quote-driven market.
This means that traders both set quotes and trade and are confronted with
informed and liquidity motivated investors who view the quoted bid and
ask and decide whether to trade one unit at a time or not. Our experimen-
tal subjects are not university students, but professional securities traders
from ﬁve Dutch banks, a fact that we feel enhances the reliability of our
results. The continuous-time environment of the experiment produces large
amountsofdata.Also,subjectsmustcontinuouslyallocatetheirscarcetime
among a number of different activities, such as modifying quotes, initiating
trades,andanalyzingtheirinformationsets.Suchasetting,inwhichtraders
must make instantaneous decisions about where to focus their energies, is
designed to mimic the rough-and-tumble of real-world securities markets.
Furthermore, our subjects, realistically, not only post quotes but also initi-
ate trades on their own account. As dealers are more numerous here (seven
quoting dealers) than in most previous experimental studies, our market
generates signiﬁcant interdealer trading.
This experimental environment is closely related to Flood et al. (1997),
anditiscomparablewithBloomﬁeldandO’Hara(1999).Floodetal.(1997)
use almost the same setting as is used here, and concentrate on the ef-
fects of posttrade transparency on market performance. Bloomﬁeld and
O’Hara(1999)studytheeffectsofbothposttradeandpretradetransparency
in a noncontinuous sequential trade setting with two market makers, and




on the price efﬁciency of those markets. The markets differ only in the way
quotes are disclosed. In the transparent market, all quotes are disclosed
publicly and immediately, which means that all market makers have all
outstanding quotes presented on their private trading screens. In the opaque
market,noquotesarepubliclydisclosed,andthemarketmakersmust“call”
oneanotherforpricequotes.Weﬁndacleartrade-offbetweenliquidityand
market efﬁciency due to the degree of public quote disclosure. In markets
where all quotes are disclosed publicly, opening spreads are smaller, and
volumeishigher,butthismarketismuchpoorerintermsofpriceefﬁciency.
Dealer prices are less responsive to new information, and pricing errors
declinelessrapidlyovertimethanintheopaquemicrostructure.Weexplain
thepriceefﬁciencyresultasdealers’optimalspeculativeresponsetoreduced
search costs in the transparent market.
The plan of the article is as follows. In section 1, we discuss the experi-
mentalmethodology.Insection2,weanalyzetheexperimentaldata,testing
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several hypotheses, and offering an interpretation of the results. Section 3
concludes.
1. Experimental Design and Implementation
1.1 Experiment overview
In this article we test the effect of two quote disclosure regimes on market
performance, especially the price discovery process. Our tests involve a
computerized experimental securities market in which seven professional
dealers act as market makers, with two computerized traders operating as
non-market-making customers.3 The experiment occurs over eight trading
rounds of ﬁve minutes each. Each round is independent, in the sense that
the parameter settings are unique for each round; information about the
security’s value derived from one round is not relevant in another.
Each market maker has his or her own computer trading screen and a
keyboard. A sample computer screen appears in Figure 1. Over the rounds
wevarytheamountofpriceinformationonthetraders’computerscreens.In
the ﬁrst four rounds (the opaque rounds), no quotes are publicly disclosed
and market makers can obtain price information only by “calling” other
market makers. In rounds 5 through 8 (transparent), all quotes are publicly
disclosed at all times in the price queues in the center of the screen.
Themicrostructureofourexperimentalenvironmentcanbeseenasacon-
tinuous, multiple-dealer version of the pure dealership market of Glosten
and Milgrom (1985). In their model, a specialist sets bid-ask quotes for in-
vestors, who observe the quoted bid and ask prices and then decide whether
to trade (one unit per transaction). The specialist is free to adjust prices at
any time. The investors represent informed and liquidity traders and do not
compete with the specialist, since they do not set limit orders in the market.
The Glosten and Milgrom market is thus quote driven. Our experimental
design differs from the Kyle (1985) framework in this sense.4 Instead, our
experimental design is most similar to the quote-driven experimental mar-
kets used by Bloomﬁeld (1996), Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1999), and Flood
etal.(1996,1997).Floodetal.(1996),however,failtoincorporateliquidity
traders, making their results less realistic than those reported here. Com-
pared with the experimental design in Bloomﬁeld (1996) and Bloomﬁeld
and O’Hara (1999), there are three signiﬁcant differences. First, market
makers in the Bloomﬁeld (1996) and Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1999) stud-
3 TheexperimentalsetupusedhereissimilartothatusedinFloodetal.(1996)andFloodetal.(1997).Weuse
the terms “market makers,” “traders” and “dealers” interchangeably to refer to the seven human subjects.
Similarly, we use the terms “robots” and “customers” interchangeably to refer to the two computerized
non-market-making customers.
4 See Madhavan (1992) for an overview of the differences between quote-driven and order-driven markets.
With some modiﬁcations, the Kyle model is the underlying framework of the experimental markets used
by Schnitzlein (1996) and Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997).
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Figure 1
Trading screen
This is an example of a trading screen in the market without quote disclosure. Each trader has his or
her own trading screen. The window on the upper left presents the cash balance (790 esquires), the
inventory of this dealer (2 LIFE shares long), the current outstanding quote of this trader (90 - 110), and
the approximate proﬁt of this trader based on the price of the last transaction in which he or she was
involved (1,010 esquires). The middle window on the left side shows the time remaining in this round.
The black window in the center of the screen is where a quote appears when this trader calls another
trader. Under the heading “ID Sell Buy ID,” ID denotes the identity of the dealer presenting the quote;
Sell denotes the quoted bid (at which this trader can sell); the Buy column contains the quoted ask (at
which this trader can buy the share). In the markets where all quotes are disclosed publicly, all bids are
presented below Sell ranked from highest to lowest, and all asks are presented below the heading Buy
ranked from lowest to highest. Information of past transactions appears at the right of the trading screen.
By default, it displays the details of the last 20 transactions. The trader can scroll through the list with the
PageUp and PageDown keys. For all transactions, the identities of the buying (under heading buy) and
the selling (sel) trader are displayed, along with the number of shares involved in the trade and the price
at which the trade cleared. For example, the ﬁrst row indicates that this trader (his identity is shown as an
asterisk *) bought one LIFE share for 100 esquires from trader B. The ten traders’ identities are denoted
by letters ranging from “A” through “J”. The robots are denoted with the letter “R”. The fourth transaction
is thus an example of a trade in which a robot sold to this trader one share for 110 esquires.
ies set quotes but do not initiate trades. In contrast, we allow for interdealer
trading, which can be a salient characteristic of multiple-dealer markets.5
Second, our market is continuous instead of sequential, in the sense that
market makers may trade and revise their quotes at any time; continuous
5 For example, in the foreign exchange market, Perraudin and Vitale (1996) report that the magnitude of
interdealertradingisroughly80%oftotalvolume.Inourexperimentalmarkets,interdealervolumeranges
from roughly 85% to 95% of total volume.
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trading has the notable beneﬁt that it yields large amounts of data. Third,
we use professional security traders as subjects rather than students.
1.2 Dealers’ objectives and the true price of the asset
At the start of each trading round, each market maker is given an initial
endowment of 1,000 esquires (a ﬁctional num´ eraire currency). All traders
are instructed to maximize their end-of-round wealth by trading for a single
security. End-of-round wealth is expressed in esquires; it equals the cash
balance at the end of the round plus the end-of-round inventory valued at
the “true price” of the asset. The true price of the asset or the “underlying”
value can be seen as an ex post liquidation value as used in, among many
others, the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) models. This true
price differs across rounds to achieve independence of the rounds.
Before the start of the experiment, the market makers were told that the
true price would be uniformly distributed between a minimum of 1 esquire
and a maximum of 200 esquires; this is the only a priori information traders
have about the true price at the start of every round. The dealers can obtain
information about the true price through transactions with robots, as dis-
cussed below. Dealers are not instructed about possible trading strategies.
Each dealer trades according to his or her own expectations and predilec-
tions. Traders can proﬁt (or lose) over the round by buying and selling (i.e.,
jobbing) and=or by building a long or short inventory of the security that is
tobeconvertedtocashatthetruepriceattheendoftrading(i.e.,speculating
on the true price). There are no short-sale restrictions or penalties. There is
no upper or lower limit on a dealer’s allowable securities inventory. During
each round, traders can trade at any time they desire in unit quantities.
The true prices are chosen as follows. First, recall that at the start of the
experiment, we told the market makers the true price would lie between 1
and 200. Therefore a uniform prior expectation of the true price would be
approximately100esquires.Intheexperimentswewantedtohaveinstances
of both upward and downward price discovery. Therefore we drew four
pricesrandomlyfromthe[1,100)intervalandfourpricesfromthe(100,200]
interval. Within these intervals we would like to have prices both far away
and close to the uniform prior expectation of 100. Therefore we chose two
pricesuniformlyfromeachofthefollowingfourintervals:[1,50),[50,100),
(100,150], and (150,200]. The true prices are reported in Table 1.
1.3 Trading and robot behavior
Each dealer is obliged to enter a quote—both bid and ask prices—within
10 seconds of the start of each round (otherwise, a penalty of 10 esquires=
second accrues).6 The dealers can change their quote at any time during the
6 Ex post, this penalty was assessed on only one occasion: dealer 3 in round 8 was eight seconds late in
submitting his quote.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
No quote disclosure Public quote disclosure
(opaque markets) (transparent markets)
1 2 3 4 567 8
Round settings
True price 69 163 134 15 22 75 118 185
Results
Quotes set 80 72 64 66 76 83 80 88
Trades
- Total 461 473 533 549 1,300 1,557 1,841 1,423
- Interdealer 387 399 459 475 1,226 1,483 1,769 1,349
- Robot 74 74 74 74 74 74 72 74
Uninformed (%) 57 38 47 46 50 46 51 51
Off-market (%) 36.2 23.6 21.1 26.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Average end-of-round capital in esquiresa
Market makers
1 ¡486 1,881 834 ¡5,071 6,127 3,656 4,633 301
22 9 ¡6,869 ¡816 ¡3,409 2,459 1,536 ¡319 ¡2,745
3 ¡35 2,686 ¡5,894 6,855 ¡5,070 ¡21,166 ¡13,041 2,436
4 ¡282 ¡1,794 487 ¡2,265 15,074 6,012 119 ¡14,364
5 ¡376 466 169 882 ¡75,664 ¡8,302 787 13,651
6 234 ¡1,410 424 ¡2,954 12,436 6,311 5,565 ¡13,683
7 571 3,481 3,224 3,757 41,689 10,656 1,386 12,495
Average ¡49 ¡223 ¡225 ¡315 ¡421 ¡185 ¡124 ¡273
Robots
Informed 155 752 745 972 1,549 550 328 707
Uninformed 18 28 42 131 ¡74 99 108 248
a Initial capital of 1,000 esquires is excluded. None of the average proﬁts of the dealers and uninformed
robots are signiﬁcant. The average proﬁts of the informed robots are all signiﬁcant. Note that robot proﬁts
are stated as the average over the two robots.
round, but cannot otherwise withdraw their quotes. Therefore, at any time
alltradershaveaquoteoutstandinginthemarket.Themaximumindividual
spread is limited to 30 esquires.7
In the transparent market, all bids and asks outstanding are presented on
the trading screen of every market maker. The bids (asks) are ranked from
the highest (lowest) on top through the lowest (highest) at the bottom, so
that the market spread is always obtainable at the top of the queues. To
buy securities, the trader presses the “B” key; the trader buys automatically
against the lowest ask available. To sell, the trader presses the “S” key; the
tradersellsautomaticallyagainstthehighestbid.AsinGlostenandMilgrom
(1985), we normalize the trade size to exactly 1 share per transaction; there
is, however, no limit on the number of transactions. After the transaction
is effected, the trade details are presented in the private transaction history
window of both counterparties.
Intheopaquemarket,informationaboutthequotesofothermarketmak-
ers is, by deﬁnition, not publicly available. Instead, in order to obtain direct
7 This restriction was imposed to prevent dealers from effectively exiting the market by quoting inﬁnite
spreads. In practice, it was almost never binding.
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price information and to trade, traders have to call one another bilater-
ally. This is done by pressing the “C” key, and then entering the identity
of the trader whose quote the caller wishes to observe.8 The quote of the
dealer called then appears on the caller’s trading screen for a maximum
of seven seconds, during which time the caller can initiate a trade. To buy
assets, the trader presses the “B” key, to sell the “S” key. After this the
caller enters the number of shares he or she wants to trade. Again, we nor-
malized the trade size to exactly 1 share per transaction (however, traders
can initiate several one-share trades during the seven seconds that the quote
is active). Note that the caller hits the quote of another market maker; the
latter is not allowed to refuse the trade. When a dealer is called, he or she is
not immediately informed about the call (the quoted price is simply taken
from the nonpublic price queues). However, as soon as the caller initiates
a transaction, the trade details are presented in the quoting dealer’s private
transaction history window.
As discussed previously, two types of subjects are involved in the exper-
iment.Inadditiontotheseven(human)marketmakers,whobothsetquotes
and trade, there are two computerized customers (robots) that trade in the
market.Therobotsdonotsetquotesandcannotbecalledbythemarketmak-
ers. The two robots represent external customers of the exchange and proxy
for both informed traders and liquidity or noise traders. The two robots are
indistinguishable to the market makers. Each robot is programmed to trade
every 7 seconds against the best prices in the market (on average, there is
a robot trade every 3.5 seconds). Whether a robot trade is to be informed
or uniformed is determined at random, just prior to each robot transaction;
the probability that the trade is informed equals .5.9 The market makers are
told this probability, and therefore know that, on average, half of the robot
trades are informed.
If a robot initiates an informed trade (with probability .5), it buys (sells)
ifthelowestaskprice(highestbid)outstandingatthattimeisbelow(above)
the true price of the security. An informed robot does not trade if the best
price equals the true price. Note that the informed robot tries to maximize
its proﬁt only at the trade level; over the whole round it is restricted to
trading only at multiples of seven seconds. Since the informed robot trades
are a function of the true price, these transactions convey information about
the true price of the asset. If a robot initiates an uninformed trade, it is
determined with probability .5 whether the robot sells or buys; if it sells
(buys) it does so against the (highest bid price) lowest ask price available
in both market structures.
8 The identity of traders is denoted with letters; fA, B :::,G g refer to the seven market makers, while “R”
refers to the robots. Robots do not quote prices, however.
9 This setup of the noise structure parallels the setup in R¨ oell (1996). Note that the robots here always
enjoy pretrade transparency, since they always transact at the best price available in the market in both
the transparent and opaque markets.
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When a market maker is involved in a robot transaction, he or she does
not receive any special notiﬁcation. That is, as for the interdealer trades, the
transactioninformationappearsinhisorherprivatetransactionhistorywin-
dowwithidentity“R”forrobot.Notethatthetraderdoesnotknowwhether
the robot trade was informed. Given their knowledge of the probability that
a robot is informed, traders must ﬁlter the relevant price information from
these robot transactions. If a robot trade is informed and the robot sells
(buys), it is a clear signal that the bid price (ask price) of the trader is above
(below) the true price of the asset.
In both the transparent and opaque microstructures, the transaction his-
torywindowcontainsallinterdealerandrobottradesinwhichtheparticular
trader is involved; we thus have a low-level posttrade transparent market.
For all transactions listed in the transaction history window, the identities
of the buyer and seller are presented, along with the transaction size (which
always equals one share in our setup) and the price at which the transaction
cleared. There is no delay in transaction disclosure.
1.4 Payoff to the subjects
At the end of each round, each trader is informed about the true price of
the asset and his or her end-of-round proﬁt. Esquire amounts are translated
into Dutch guilders as follows. The dealer with the greatest end-of-round
wealth receives 7 guilders, the second-best dealer receives 6 guilders, etc.10






April 29, 1997. The subjects were seven professional traders from de Gen-
erale Bank, Optiver, and Rabobank. All subjects traded as market makers
in eight independent rounds; i.e., information about asset values obtained
in one round is irrelevant in other rounds.
Table1presentsthesettingsandsummarystatistics.Westartedwithfour




10 At the time of the experiments, the guilder-dollar exchange rate was roughly 1 USD = 1.90 NLG. We
also gave the market makers a ﬁxed amount equal to 125 guilders for showing up. It should be noted,
however, that the dealers were strongly motivated by professional pride in their trading ability, a factor
which should be roughly proportional to esquire trading proﬁts and which may dominate their guilder
payoffs as a behavioral incentive.
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article mimics the experiments from Flood et al. (1996), with qualitatively
very similar results. As noted, the difference with those experiments is that
we include liquidity motivated traders, where Flood et al. (1996) did not.
Furthermore, we reverse the sequence of the market structures relative to
Flood et al. (1996), who started with public price disclosure and ended with
opaque markets. Since the results we present in this article are qualitatively
similar to theirs, we feel comfortable about the robustness of the results.
From Table 1 we ﬁnd, on average, 76 quote settings and 430 interdealer
transactions in the opaque markets, and 82 quote settings and 1,457 inter-
dealer transactions in the transparent markets.11 There is an average of 74
robot transactions initiated per round in both market types. Table 1 also
shows that, on average, dealers made small losses (although the zero-sum
nature of the experiment means that if some market makers make large
gains, others generally make large losses). On average, the market makers
makeslightlynegativeproﬁts,largelybecausetheymusttradewithinformed
robots, to whom they always lose. In principle, market makers might re-
cover these adverse-selection losses by earning the spread, especially as
information revelation reduces the magnitude of adverse-selection losses.
However, on net, the adverse-selection losses are not fully recovered. Note
that market makers’ average losses do not differ systematically across the
transparent and opaque market settings—these are determined mostly by
informedrobots’proﬁtability;however,thedispersionofproﬁtsishigherin
the transparent market, reﬂecting more intensive interdealer trading there.
2. Results
In this section we test three hypotheses concerning the effects of quote
disclosure on market performance. The tests are based on the experimental
datadrawnfromsevenprofessionaltradersovereightrounds,asdiscussedin
theprecedingsection.Inbrief,weﬁndamarkedtrade-offbetweenliquidity
and price efﬁciency. We conclude that both the higher liquidity and slower
price discovery of the more transparent market are the result of speculating
dealers exploiting the lower search costs in this market. It is worth noting
that the results reported here correspond qualitatively with those found in
two pilot experiments.
2.1 Volume
Regarding liquidity, we ﬁrst note the sharp discrepancy in trading volume
between the transparent and opaque markets. The average trading volume
in the markets with no public quote disclosure was 504, while the average
for the transparent markets was roughly three times higher at 1,530. We at-
11 This higher number of transactions in the market where all quotes are publicly disclosed is largely due to
the trading mechanism, since prices are more difﬁcult to obtain in the markets without quote disclosure,
which increases the time needed to initiate a transaction.
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tribute this difference directly to transparency: dealers spent relatively less
time sampling prices (and correspondingly more time engaging in trans-
actions) due to reduced search costs in the transparent market. Note that
there is both an informational component (knowing more prices sooner)
and a logistical component (less time is spent canvassing the market and
identifying the counterparty for a transaction) to this reduction in search
costs. Both components play a role in the increased volume.
The fact that search costs are a signiﬁcant factor in the opaque market is
revealed in the proportion of executed interdealer trades that fail to ﬁnd the
best currently available price (we refer to these as “off-market prices”). We
presume that a dealer would not intentionally trade at an off-market price.
Thus, in the transparent market, all trades automatically go to the dealer
whose price is at the top of the relevant queue, implying no off-market
trades there. In the opaque market, on the other hand, the market spread
is not automatically hit, and off-market trades do occur. The proportion of
trades occurring at off-market prices is in the 20% to 30% range for the
opaque market (see Table 1). The ﬂip side of the fact that off-market prices
canattracttradesisthefactthatthebestpricesometimesfailstogetthetrade
in the opaque market. As a result, dealers tend to reprice more aggressively
in the opaque market, a fact examined more closely below.
A noteworthy characteristic of these markets is the large proportion of
trading that is interdealer. This fact is related to speculative position-taking
by the dealers. The basic speculative force at work in our experiments is
obvious—dealers should buy when they see robots buy, sell when they sell
(even lacking a robot trade, a dealer may nonetheless infer something about
the robots’ behavior by observing his own transactions with other dealers).
However, implementing this basic speculative tactic is complicated by the
zero-sum property that imposes pronounced patterns among participant in-
ventories. That is, any large position taken by an individual dealer must
be absorbed somewhere else in the system; since robot positions are con-
strained by their predeﬁned transaction rate, this implies that the bulk of
any dealer position must be balanced by a countermanding position with
another dealer. Thus a dealer’s inventory may not reﬂect his or her specula-
tive intentions. This is apparent in Table 1, which shows individual dealers’
proﬁtability in each round. While individual dealers’ proﬁts or losses can
be enormous (e.g., consider round 5), the cross-sectional average is always
quite small. Indeed, it seems that the high level of interdealer trade results
largelyfromastruggleamongthedealerstokeeptheirpositionsontheright
side of the market, a ﬁght that not all of them can win.
2.2 Spreads
Inﬁnancialmarkets,thecostsofmarketmakingandinformationasymmetry
among market participants are seen as the primary motivations for the bid-
askspreads.Thetheoreticalimplicationsofinformationasymmetriesforthe
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bid-askspreadarequitesensitivetothemicrostructureunderconsideration.
There is a broad consensus that a dealer’s spread will widen to compensate
the dealer for losses to informed traders. At the same time, certain dynamic
strategies—for example, Madhavan (1995)—call for the dealer to narrow
spreads in early trading in order to attract informed order ﬂow, so that
the information so learned can be exploited in subsequent trading. On the
other hand, Leach and Madhavan (1993) compare dynamic dealer pricing
strategies in monopoly-dealer and multiple-dealer markets. They conclude
that a monopoly specialist will widen, rather than narrow, spreads to better
ﬁlter information from their trades: wider spreads are more likely to drive
away noise traders than informed traders. Competing dealers do not engage
inpriceexperimentation,sincethesignal-to-noiseratioisonlyimprovedby
trading at wider spreads, but this is impossible since widening one’s spread
drives order ﬂow to the other dealers.
Madhavan’s (1995) analysis would suggest that our dealers should nar-
rowspreadstoattractinformedorderﬂowandwidenthemafterward.Leach
and Madhavan’s (1993) model would suggest the opposite. Notably, how-
ever,ourmarketisveryclosetothesetupdescribedinLeachandMadahvan
(1993), with the important differences that we allow for interdealer trading,
whereastheydonot,andtheirmarketisfullypre-andposttradetransparent,
whereas ours is not. Interdealer trading is important, because our dealers
canexploitinformationfrom“purchased”robotorderﬂowagainsttheirfel-
lowmarketmakers,whereasLeachandMadhavan’scannot.Tosummarize,
then, we propose the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis H10. Dealer spreads are narrowed to attract informed (i.e.,
robot) trades.
We test this hypothesis by examining the response of dealer spreads to
robot transactions. If the spread was narrowed speciﬁcally to attract in-
formed order ﬂow, then the spread should widen after the event, since sub-
sequent robot trades should be signiﬁcantly less informative than the ﬁrst
such trade. We deﬁne s.i; j;r/ as the log spread size for theith quote set by
trader j in roundr, and 1s.i; j;r/ as the change in spreads between quotes
i and (i ¡ 1). We limit the sample of events to quote changes that occurred
within 10 seconds after a robot trade. The rationale for restricting the event
window is to reduce the likelihood that contaminating events would bias
the results.12 We thus estimate the following regression:
1s.i; j;r/ D ® C ®j C ¯I.r 2 QD/ C ².i; j;r/; .1/
12 Tochecktherobustnessofthisprocedureforthepossibleintroductionofcontaminatingfactorsintheevent
window, we reestimated the regression for 20-, 30-, and 60-second windows. The results are qualitatively
similar. In particular, all parameter estimates have the same signs and order of magnitude. However, the
absolutesizeoftheestimatedcoefﬁcientsandtheassociated R2’sdecreasesgraduallyastheeventwindow
grows, suggesting that the larger window allows more noise, but not contaminating events.





Whole trading period (start at 0 through 300)
10-second event window 0.635 ¡0.110
(0.046) (0.089)
Half trading period (start at 0 through 150)
10-second event window 0.508 ¡0.025
(0.078) (0.155)
Thistablecontainstheestimatesofthecoefﬁcientsfromthe
ﬁxed individual effects panel model [Equation (1)]. Here
the individual spread adjustment (changes in log spread)
followingrobottradesisregressedonaconstant(®),dealer-
speciﬁc dummies (aj), and a market structure indicator (¯)
that equals 1 for the transparent markets and 0 otherwise.
The sample is restricted to spread changes occuring within
10 seconds after a dealer’s prices are hit by a robot trade.
® thus represents the widening of the spread after a robot
trade.
Standard errors in parentheses.
For the whole trading period, R2 D 0:173 and n D 204.
For the half trading period, R2 D 0:183 and n D 107.
where ®j are trader-speciﬁc constants (i.e., a ﬁxed individual effects panel
model), I(.) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the condition in paren-
thesesistrueand0elsewhere,QDisthesetofallroundswithpublicquotes
disclosure, and ² is the usual error term. According to H10, ® should be
positive and signiﬁcant. Estimates of Equation (1) appear in Table 2.
The results conﬁrm the null hypothesis, that dealers widen their spreads
aftertradingwithrobots.The®estimatesareallpositiveandsigniﬁcant.The
implicationisthatdealersindeedattempttopurchaseinformedorderﬂow,at
least until they achieve a potentially informative robot trade. The parameter
estimates are not strikingly different when estimated only over the ﬁrst
150 seconds of trading. The ¯ estimates are all negative but insigniﬁcant,
implyingthisbehaviordoesnotdifferstronglyacrosstransparencyregimes.
The negative sign on ¯ indicates that spread adjustments are smaller in the
transparent market; this is consistent with the evidence presented below of
more aggressive pricing strategies in the opaque market.
Wealsoconsiderthebroaderevolutionofspreadsthroughoutthetrading
round. In the literature on posttrade transparency, the general consensus is
thatopeningspreadsintransparentmarketsarewider,butthatthedifference
in spreads between transparent and opaque markets disappears over time.13
Madhavan (1995) rationalizes this by stating that market makers compete
for order ﬂow to obtain information; they therefore quote more competitive
13 SeeBloomﬁeldandO’Hara(1999)andFloodetal.(1997)forexperimentalresults.R¨ oell(1996)analyzes
theoretically the effects of transparency on spreads. Gemmill (1996) presents an empirical investigation
of the London Stock Exchange, but ﬁnds mixed results.
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spreadsin(posttrade)opaquemarkets.Thiscompetitionisreducedintrans-
parent markets, since information is disclosed publicly, and quoted spreads
therefore widen.
Thus the disclosure of transaction information has substantial effects on
spread sizes, but there is less evidence on the effects of pretrade quote dis-
closure on spreads. Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1999) address this latter issue,
but ﬁnd no effect of quote disclosure on (opening) spreads. However, since
spreads arise to cover the operational and asymmetric information costs
of market making, one would expect different quote disclosure regimes to
have different impacts on spreads. For instance, the higher search costs im-
posedinamarketwithalowlevelofpublicpricedisclosureshouldresultin
higher spreads. (It is worth emphasizing that the literature predicts that pre-
trade transparency and posttrade transparency will have opposite effects on
spreads.Increasingpretradetransparencynarrowsopeningspreads,whereas
an increase in posttrade transparency leads to wider opening spreads.)
In addition, disclosing quotes publicly reduces the asymmetric informa-
tion problem, and should therefore lead to smaller spreads. This creates a
second-order effect. As trading evolves over the trading period, more infor-
mation is shared by the market makers and the informational differences
between market structures diminish. This would imply that the differences
in spreads, due to information asymmetry, would decline over the trading
period. Combining both effects, we test the following hypothesis:
HypothesisH20. Dealerspreadsarewiderinamarketwithoutpublicprice
information than in a market in which all quotes are publicly disclosed;
furthermore, the difference in spread size declines over time.
Toexaminethespreaddifferencesbetweenmicrostructures,wespliteach
trading round in 30 intervals of 10 seconds each. In Figure 2 we present the
averagespreadsizeoverallmarketmakersandallroundsforallintervalsin
both the market with public quote disclosure and without public informa-
tion on quotes. As Madhavan (1992) predicts for quote-driven markets, the
average dealer spread shrinks over the trading period in both market types,
which we attribute to declining information asymmetries as more transac-
tionsaresettled.Furthermore,Figure2indicatescleardifferencesinspreads
betweenbothmarkettypes,asstatedunderthenullhypothesis.Theopening
spreads in the rounds without quote disclosure are signiﬁcantly wider than
in the rounds with public information on quotes.14 Over the trading period,
14 Signiﬁcanceisata10%conﬁdencelevelinapproximatelytheﬁrst120seconds.Wecomparedtheaverage
spreadsofeachmarketmakeroverbothmarketstructures.Ateachintervalwethereforehavetwosamples
consisting of seven matching spreads, that is, one for each market structure. Then we conducted a two-
sample sign test [see Bain and Engelhardt (1987) for more details]. This test compares the medians of
bothsamples,withtheadvantagethatwedonotneedtoassumenormalityofthespreads.Wedo,however,
need to assume independence, but this is likely given that we are comparing two samples from different
market structures.
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Figure 2
Average dealer spreads over time
This ﬁgure presents the time-series patterns of the average dealer spreads, in esquires, over 30 intervals
of 10 seconds each. Each line represents the average of the spreads over rounds with the same market
structure, deﬁned as the difference between the quoted ask and bid price, over all quotes outstanding
during each interval.
the market-maker spreads narrow in the markets without quote disclosure
on quotes such that eventually no differences in spread size are apparent.
Both aspects of the null hypothesis are supported by the data.
2.3 Price efﬁciency
Intuitively,oneexpectsthatthemorepriceinformationisavailable,themore
information will be impounded in dealers’ quotes. O’Hara (1995, p. 270),
for example, makes this case, as noted above in the introduction. In other
words, price transparency improves price discovery. In their experiments,
Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1999) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of quote
disclosureonpricingerrors.Theseerrors,deﬁnedastheabsolutedifference
between the true price of the asset being traded and the midpoint of the
market spread, decline over the trading period, but Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara
ﬁndnosigniﬁcantevidencethattheydeclinemorerapidlyinmarketswhere
allquotesarepubliclydisclosed.Ontheotherhand,Floodetal.(1996)show
that the price discovery process is signiﬁcantly slower in markets where all
quotes are publicly disclosed than in markets without quote disclosure. The
52Quote Disclosure and Price Discovery in Multiple-Dealer Markets
Figure 3
Average price errors over time
This ﬁgure presents the time-series patterns of the price error, averaged over all dealers and rounds with
the same market structure at each second during the trading round.
experimental market they used is similar to the market discussed here, but
withoutnoisetraders;theirmarketmakerswereconfrontedinsteadonlywith
informed customers. Nonetheless, we state a null hypothesis to conform to
the intuitive consensus:
Hypothesis H30. Public disclosure of dealer quotes enhances price efﬁ-
ciency.
To examine the effects of quote disclosure on prices, we ﬁrst consider
the time path of dealer pricing errors, deﬁned as the absolute difference
between the midpoint of a quote and the true price of the asset. In Figure 3
we plot the average price error over all dealers and rounds with the same
market structure for each second. We discard the ﬁrst 10 seconds, since this
is the timespan we allowed the market makers to enter their initial quotes.
The price errors decline over time and we observe that these price errors
decline more rapidly in the market without public quote disclosure.
Figure 3 clearly suggests differences in price efﬁciency between the
two market structures. To examine this more formally, let P.j;t;r/ be the
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price error obtained from the quote of market maker j in round r at time
t (measured in seconds). We test whether the pricing errors decline more
rapidly in a transparent market by regressing the pricing errors on a time
trend variable, t, whereby the effect of quote disclosure is split over two
slope coefﬁcients.
P.j;t;r/ D ® C ®j C ¯1I.r 2 QD/ C ¯2tI.r 2 QD/
C ¯3tI.r 2 NQD/ C ².j;t;r/; (2)
where I(.) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the condition in paren-
theses is true and 0 elsewhere, t is the time trend, QD is the set of all rounds
in which quotes are publicly disclosed, NQD is the set of rounds in which
quotesarenotdisclosed,and² isani.i.d.errorterm.Notethatwepooledthe
data over all eight rounds and the seven market makers in the regression.15
We added speciﬁc constants ®j (individual effects) to control for the spe-
ciﬁc characteristics of trader j. The effect of quote disclosure on the price
errors is captured by both the initial level effect—measured by the market
structuredummy(¯1)—andbythedifferencebetweentheslopecoefﬁcients
for the markets where all quotes are disclosed (¯2) and where no quotes are
disclosed (¯3). Table 3 contains the estimates of these slope coefﬁcients.
From Table 3 we ﬁrst observe that all parameter estimates are signiﬁ-
cant except for the market structure dummy. The constant term equals 53,
which equals the average absolute true price deviation from 100, which is
the initial market maker’s expectation of the true price when no price in-
formation has entered the market. The market structure dummy suggests
that the initial level of the price errors is not signiﬁcantly different between
both market structures. Since these initial price errors are equal for both
market structures, we use the differences in the speed with which the price
errors are corrected, captured by the slope coefﬁcients of the linear trends
in Equation (1), as a measure of relative price efﬁciency. The estimates for
bothslopecoefﬁcients¯2 and¯3 arenegativeandsigniﬁcant,indicatingthat
thepricingerrorsdeclineovertime,reﬂectingtheaccumulationofinforma-
tion over time as trading proceeds in both markets. The difference between
the two time trend coefﬁcients equals 0.04, indicating that pricing errors
decline more rapidly (the slope is more negative) in markets where quotes
are not publicly disclosed. Using price errors as a measure of efﬁciency, we
conclude that markets without pretrade information are more efﬁcient than
markets with public prices, thus rejecting Hypothesis H20. On the other
15 Note that if price discovery (deﬁned here as quoted prices within three esquires of the true price) had been
achieved in only some of the rounds, then a test with pooled data would be biased, since market-makers’
pricing strategy would likely change in the vicinity of the true price. However, the dealers never achieved
full price discovery. Furthermore, note that robot trades can only indicate the direction of the true price
(higher or lower) to the dealer, so that variation in absolute levels of the true prices across rounds should
not bias the test either.
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Table 3
Price efﬁciency
Intercept Market Public quote No public
(®) structure disclosure disclosure
(¯1)( ¯2)( ¯3)
Estimated slope 53.169 0.528 ¡0.098 ¡0.134




This table contains the estimates of the slope coefﬁcients in the ﬁxed
individual effects model [Equation (2)]. Here the time path of price
errors of individual market makers is regressed on a constant, on a
market structure dummy (¯1) that equals 1 if the market has public quote
disclosure and 0 elsewhere, and on two slope coefﬁcients (¯2 and ¯3) for
the time trend in the rounds with and without public disclosure of quotes,
respectively. The individuals in the panel are the market makers, so that
we correct for cross-sectional differences between all market makers.




Robust standard errors for a general variance-covariance matrix are
presented in parentheses [see Arellano (1987)].
R2 D 0:149.
hand, this result is in line with Flood et al. (1996), and not inconsistent with
BloomﬁeldandO’Hara(1999)whoﬁndnosigniﬁcantrelationshipbetween
quote disclosure and pricing errors.
To conﬁrm this rather striking result, we examine average dealer price
responses to new information. If prices indeed impound new information,
thenthisfactshouldbeevidentindealerquoterevisionsfollowinginforma-
tion arrivals. We examine the magnitude of such quote revisions using the
most clear-cut informational innovations for a dealer, namely robot trades.
Foreachdealer j inroundr,wecollectedallquoterevisions, P.t/,where P
isthenewmidpointofthedealerspreadandt rangesfrom1(theinitialquote
posting) up to the total number quote revisions by trader j. From this we
calculate all log-price changes 1P.t/ D lnP.t/ ¡ lnP.t ¡ 1/.t D 2;:::/.
Using the number of robot trades in the period (t ¡ 1;t], we construct a
dummy variable, R.j;t;r/, that equals 1 if a robot bought from trader j
in period (t ¡ 1;t], ¡1 if a robot sold to j, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore,
we deﬁne indicator variables—I.r 2 QD/ and I.r 2 NQD/—as before to
represent the transparency level in the market. Finally, we pool all rounds
and dealers in a panel dataset, controlling for dealer-speciﬁc (e.g., skill)
effects by allowing for an individual-speciﬁc intercept, ®j, and testing for
the differences in price responses between the two market structures in a
fashion similar to Equation (1):
1P.j;t;r/ D ® C ®j C ¯1I.r 2 QD/ C ¯2I.r 2 QD/R.j;t;r/
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Table 4
Price responses
Intercept Market Public quote No public
(®) structure disclosure disclosure
(¯1)( ¯2)( ¯3)
Estimated slope ¡0.015 0.032 0.063 0.119
coefﬁcient (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
Difference in ¡0.056
slopes (¯2 ¡ ¯3) (0.016)
This table contains the estimates of the slope coefﬁcients in the price
response ﬁxed individual effects panel model [Equation (3)]. Here the
individual price adjustment (log price returns) following robot trades is
regressed on a constant (®), on a market structure dummy (¯1) that equals
1 if the market has public quote disclosure and 0 otherwise, a robot trade
dummy that equals +1 for a robot purchase and ¡1 for a robot sale, times
anindicatorvariableforthetransparentmarkets(¯2),ortimesanindicator
for the opaque marktes (¯3). ¯2 and ¯3 thus represent the average price
increase (decrease), measured as log price relatives, following a robot
purchase (sale). The individuals in the panel are the market makers, so
that we correct for cross-sectional differences between all market makers.
Thedataarepooledoversevenmarket makersandeightrounds; n D 553.
Fordetailsonestimatingﬁxedindividualeffectspanelmodels,seeBaltagi
(1995).
Robust standard errors for a general variance-covariance matrix are
presented in parentheses [see Arellano (1987)].
R2 D 0:227.
C ¯3I.r 2 NQD/R.j;t;r/ C ².j;t;r/ (3)
The results appear in Table 4. All parameter estimates are signiﬁcant.
The intercept ® is negative, whereas the market-structure dummy (¯1)i s
positive. The sum of both is a function of the level of the true prices relative
to the initial price expectation of 100, since these parameters reﬂect the
average price adjustment. Regarding the price response coefﬁcients (¯2 and
¯3),theyarebothpositiveandsigniﬁcantasexpected,indicatingthatdealers
do impound robot trade information appropriately in both microstructures,
raising prices when robots buy, and lowering prices when robots sell. More
importantly, the difference between the transparent and opaque markets,
¯2 ¡ ¯3, is negative and signiﬁcant, implying that dealers in the opaque
market are more aggressive in responding to new information. This is en-
tirely consistent with the results in Table 4, again leading to a rejection of
the null hypothesis.
3. Summary and Conclusions
While the issue of posttrade transparency has received considerable atten-
tion in the literature, the degree of pretrade transparency is also of central
importance. Securities markets worldwide employ a bewildering variety
of degrees of public quote disclosure, with implications that are not well
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understood. We consider the impact of quote disclosure in a continuous
multiple-dealer market in an experimental setting. Seven professional mar-
ket makers set quotes and trade with other market makers and customers
that represent both informed and liquidity motivated traders. Over multiple
rounds we vary the amount of quote information that is publicly available
between two extremes: a market where all quotes are publicly disclosed
and a market with no public quote disclosure. Our study represents an ad-




amounts of data and permits us to examine more closely the relationship
between the price and inventory components of a dealer’s strategy.
We can summarize our results as follows. Pretrade transparency signiﬁ-
cantly reduces search costs, thus alleviating some uncertainty and facilitat-
ing trade. As a result, market liquidity, measured by spreads and volume,
is greater in the transparent market: opening spreads are smaller and inter-
dealer trading volume is much higher. Dealers learn about the underlying
price both directly, by trading with (potentially) informed robots, and indi-
rectly, by observing changes in the prices quoted by other dealers. Dealers
actively attempt to attract robot trades by quoting relatively tight spreads
until a robot trade is achieved. Negligible search costs in the transparent
market imply that speculating dealers see clearly how to shade quotes to
avoid being picked off in a trade on the “wrong” side of the market and how
to keep their price competitive on the “right” side. The important and coun-
terintuitive upshot is that rational speculating dealers use less aggressive
price adjustments in the transparent market, thus slowing price discovery.
Conversely,intheopaquemarket,searchcostspreventaccurateobservation
of competing prices, so that ﬁnely tuned quote shading is discouraged, and
price adjustments are signiﬁcantly more aggressive. The overall result is a
distinct trade-off between liquidity and price efﬁciency.
Our explanation for this trade-off revolves around search costs. Pretrade
transparencyreducessearchcosts,thusalleviatingsomeuncertaintyandfa-
cilitatingtrade.Marketliquidity,measuredbyspreadsandvolume,isthere-
fore greater. At the same time, however, these reduced search costs imply
that dealers can (optimally) more narrowly ﬁne-tune their price improve-
ments. The upshot is that rational speculating dealers use less aggressive
price adjustments, thus slowing price discovery. In light of these results, it
seemsplausiblethatsomecombinationofbothmicrostructurescouldoffset
the disadvantages of each individually. We note with interest that curious
combinationsofmicrostructuresdoexistinpractice(directversusbrokered
foreignexchangetradingorupstairsversusﬂoortradingofcommonstocks).
Further research is warranted to gain insights into the performance of such
combined market structures.
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